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PROPERTY
I. CAVEAT EMPTOR-SALE OF UNIMPROVED LAND
The South Carolina Supreme Court declined to continue its
movement away from the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale
of residential real estate in Jackson v. River Pines, Inc.' The
court held that an implied warranty of fitness for intended use
does not spring from the sale of unimproved land upon which a
new building is subsequently constructed and sold.2 Consistent
with the majority of American jurisdictions that have considered
the issue,' this ruling signifies that developers will not be held
strictly liable for defects in the sale of unimproved property.
The plaintiff purchased from the corporate defendant, River
Pines, Inc., a lot that was subject to certain restrictive covenants
limiting its use to residential home development.4 The plaintiff
and her husband, a contractor, constructed a house and a septic
tank disposal system on the unimproved land and then sold the
improved lot to third parties.5 Upon discovering that the lot
contained soil that would not support a septic system, the third
parties sued and obtained a judgment against the plaintiffs.6
Seeking indemnification for this judgment, plaintiffs sued River
Pines, Inc. for breach of an implied warranty of fitness of the
land for residential purposes.7 The trial judge sustained the de-
murrer of the corporate defendant. On appeal the supreme court
affirmed, holding that "no cause was stated since no such im-
1. 276 S.C. 29, 274 S.E.2d 912 (1981).
2. Id. at 31, 274 S.E.2d at 913.
3. See, e.g., Scott v. Gill, 352 So. 2d 1143 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977); Stepanov v.
Gavrilovich, 594 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1979); Witty v. Schramm, 62 Ill. App. 3d 185, 379
N.E.2d 333 (1978); Griffith v. Byers Constr. Co., 212 Kan. 65, 510 P.2d 198 (1973); Ben-
nett v. Columbus Land Co., 70 Mich. App. 403, 246 N.W.2d 8 (1976); Beri, Inc. v. Sali-
shan Properties, Inc., 282 Or. 569, 580 P.2d 173 (1978); Cook v. Salishan Properties, Inc.,
279 Or. 333, 569 P.2d 1033 (1977).
4. 276 S.C. at 30, 274 S.E.2d at 914.
5. Record at 1; Brief for Respondents at 1.
6. 276 S.C. at 30, 274 S.E.2d at 912. This judgment was based on the breach of the
implied warranty of fitness for a new house. Record at 17.
7. 276 S.C. at 30, 274 S.E.2d at 912.
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plied warranty attaches in South Carolina.""
Noting that in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation
the doctrine of caveat emptor generally governs the obligations
of the parties in the sale of real estate, the court indicated that
in South Carolina the purchaser of unimproved land must spe-
cifically covenant to protect whatever special rights or interests
he expects to acquire in the land.' The court recognized that an
implied warranty of fitness for intended use springs from the
sale of a new buildingl ° but reasoned that different considera-
tions attach to the sale of unimproved land. Quoting extensively
from Lane v. Trenholm Building Co.,11 the court concluded that
the doctrine of caveat emptor continues to govern the sale of
real estate in South Carolina.
12
Since 1970, the South Carolina Supreme Court has nar-
rowed considerably the scope of the doctrine in the sale of new
homes by a vendor-builder. 3 The court has, however, empha-
sized the distinction between the sale of land and the sale of a
residence and has limited its protection to the innocent pur-
chaser of a house.14 In Lane, the court buttressed this distinc-
tion with the following observations:
The doctrine of merger of warranties in a deed is applicable to
real estate sales but [is] not relevant to the sale of a product
such as a building. When land is conveyed, there is often no
8. Id.
9. Id. at 31, 274 S.E.2d at 913.
10. Id. (citing Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976);
Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970)).
11. 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976).
12. 276 S.C. at 31, 274 S.E.2d at 913.
13. Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768 (1980); Lane v. Trenhoim Build-
ing, 267 S.C. 497, 229 S.E.2d 728 (1976), Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d
792 (1970).
14. In Rutledge, which held that an implied warranty applies when a new house is
sold by the vendor-builder, the court recognized the inefficacy of caveat emptor because
of the distinction "between the usual, normal sale of lands, and old buildings and a
transaction where the vendor is also the builder of a new structure." 254 S.C. at 413, 175
S.E.2d at 794. Six years later in Lane, the court relied on this distinction to hold that
when a new building is sold, an implied warranty of fitness for its intended use springs
from the sale itself. 267 S.C. at 500, 229 S.E.2d at 729. Recently, in Terlinde, the court
reasoned that Lane, coupled with the abandonment of the privity concept, mandated a
holding that "an implied warranty for latent defects [of a home] extends to subsequent
home purchasers for a reasonable amount of time." 275 S.C. at 399, 271 S.E.2d at 770.
For a discussion of Lane and Terlinde, see Property, Annual Survey of South Carolina
Law, 33 S.C.L. REv. 131 (1981).
194 [Vol. 34
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clearly defined objective in the transfer making it impossible to
imply a warranty of fitness for any purpose. Even when a par-
ticular purpose is contemplated, such as evidenced by restric-
tive covenants, the suitability of the land may depend on archi-
tectural proposals or other matters entirely independent of the
conveyance. Finally, the purchaser can fully inspect undevel-
oped land so that the consequences of denying an implied war-
ranty are not unfair or unjust.15
In light of Lane, the decision in Jackson is not surprising,
but the fairness of the ruling may initially seem questionable. It
seems harsh that plaintiffs purchased a lot restricted to residen-
tial purposes only to incur subsequent liability to third-party
purchasers because of the land's inherent unsuitability for that
purpose. On the other hand, plaintiffs were residential home
builders who had ample opportunity to inspect the unimproved
lot,' and it was their construction of the sewage system that
precipitated the subsequent litigation. Clearly, plaintiffs in this
case are not the innocent purchasers whom the South Carolina
Supreme Court has sought to protect.
The court's decision in Jackson not to restrict the doctrine
of caveat emptor in sales of unimproved land avoids the "injec-
tion of an element of uncertainty in real estate transac-
tions .... -17 Based on sound reasoning and ample authority,
this limitation on the expanding number of exceptions to the
doctrine seems appropriate.
II. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
Based on a recodification of the English Statute of Eliza-
beth,'8 section 27-23-10 of the South Carolina Code provides
15. 267 S.C. at 501-02, 229 S.E.2d at 730. Concerning its third observation, the court
cited as contrary authority Hinson v. Jefferson, 287 N.C. 422, 215 S.E.2d 102 (1975),
which held that an implied warranty was breached when a lot subject to restrictive cove-
nants limiting its use to construction of a single-family dwelling, could not be used for
that purpose. 267 S.C. at 502 n. 2, 229 S.E.2d at 730 n. 2. In Hinson, the North Carolina
Supreme Court rescinded a contract for breach of an implied warranty when a widow-
purchaser discovered that her unimproved lot would not support a sewage system for a
proposed dwelling. 287 N.C. at 436, 215 S.E.2d at 111. This decision's restriction of the
doctrine of caveat emptor in a sale of land is unique to North Carolina.
16. Brief for Respondents at 10.
17. 276 S.C. at 32, 274 S.E.2d at 913.
18. An Act Againft Fraudulent Deeds, Alienations, &c., 1570, 13 Eliz., ch. 5.
19821
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that a debtor's conveyance intended to defraud his creditors
shall be void. 9 In Tuller v. Nantahala Park Co., 0 the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that a creditor must reduce the
debt owed to judgment and have an execution issued and re-
turned nulla bona21 before asserting the statute as a defense to
void a fraudulent conveyance. 22 The reaffirmance of this com-
mon-law condition precedent indicates the court's intent to con-
tinue to require a plaintiff to exhaust available legal remedies
before availing himself of an equitable remedy."
Defendants Nantahala Park Company and Hilton Head
Plantation Company, subsidiaries of Sea Pines Company, were
land developers.24 In October 1973, Nantahala obtained a $3.4
million loan 25 from plaintiff, Cousins Mortgage Equity and In-
vestments.26 Cousins received a mortgage on approximately
7,000 acres of Nantahala's real estate in North Carolina 27 and
the parties agreed that some of Hilton Head's property would be
pledged as further security for the loan.28 Several weeks later,
19. S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-23-10 (1976) provides:
Every feoffment, gift, grant, alienation, bargain and conveyance of lands,
tenements or hereditaments, goods and chattels, or of any of them, or of any
lease, rent, commons or other profit or charge out of the same, by writing or
otherwise, and every bond, suit, judgment and execution which may be had or
made to or for any intent or purpose to delay, hinder or defraud creditors and
others of their just and lawful actions, suits, debts, accounts, damages, penal-
ties and forfeitures shall be deemed and taken (only as against that person or
persons, his or their heirs, successors, executors, administrators and assigns,
and every of them, whose actions, suits, debts, accounts, damages, penalties
and forfeitures by such guileful, covinous or fraudulent devices and practices,
as is aforesaid, are, shall or might be in any ways disturbed, hindered, delayed,
or defrauded) to be clearly and utterly void, frustrate and of no effect, any
pretense, color, feigned consideration, expressing of use, or any other matter or
thing to the contrary notwithstanding.
20. - S.C. -, 281 S.E.2d 474 (1981).
21. The latin phrase nulla bona means the defendant has no goods to levy upon in
satisfaction of a judgment. W.J. Klein Co. v. Kneece, 239 S.C. 478, 123 S.E.2d 870 (1962).
22. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 476-77.
23. See G. GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENc ES § 72 (rev. ed. 1940).
24. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 475.
25. Because the development loan agreement executed concurrently with the note
provided for periodic funding, Nantahala only received a portion of the loan in October
1973. Id. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 475; Record at 45.
26. Plaintiff Tuller was the nominee of the trustees of Cousins in this action.
27. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 475.
28. The Cousins-Nantahala agreement specified a first mortgage on 42.42 acres
known as Bobbs Island and owned by Hilton Head; however, a 58-acre tract also owned
by Hilton Head was later substituted for the 42.42 acres. Record at 18, 45.
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Citibank and First National Bank of Chicago (collectively re-
ferred to as "Banks") entered into a revolving credit loan agree-
ment with Hilton Head that was secured by a mortgage to 3,300
acres of Hilton Head's property. In April 1974, Hilton Head,
pursuant to the Cousins-Nantahala agreement, gave Cousins a
mortgage to a separate 58-acre tract on Hilton Head Island. Re-
lying on this additional security, Cousins made further advances
to Nantahala from the $3.4 million loan.
In late 1974, Sea Pines and its subsidiaries encountered
financial difficulty. To avoid foreclosing on their loan, the Banks
purchased all of the outstanding stock of Hilton Head.29 In Feb-
ruary of 1976, Cousins began foreclosure proceedings against
Nantahala to satisfy its outstanding debt. Cousins acquired the
mortgaged property at the foreclosure sale,30 and sought to sat-
isfy the remaining debt by foreclosing its mortgage on the 58-
acre tract pledged by Hilton Head. As a defense,3' defendants
asserted that Hilton Head's mortgage to Cousins had been a
fraudulent conveyance under the Statute of Elizabeth. The spe-
cial referee concluded that the mortgage was a fraudulent con-
veyance. On appeal, the circuit court reversed and ordered fore-
closure.32 Defendants appealed the circuit court decision.
Adopting the decision of the circuit court judge, the South
Carolina Supreme Court relied on the rule that "the obtaining of
a judgment and a nulla bona return is a condition precedent to
bringing a suit to void a voluntary transfer as a fraudulent con-
veyance.'33 Citing Penning v. Reid,-4 the court explained that a
debtor's final solvency is determinative of whether his assets will
satisfy his debts. According to Penning, if this final solvency
shows that the debtor's property is insufficient to pay those
debts existing when the debtor made the voluntary conveyance,
29. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 475.
30. Id. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 475-76.
31. The court summarily rejected the additional defenses offered by Hilton Head
Co. and the Banks. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 478-79.
32. Id. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 476.
33. Id.
34. 167 S.C. 263, 166 S.E. 139 (1932). The special referee relied on Penning to con-
clude that the fraudulent conveyance was void. Record at 36. However, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court, in agreement with the circuit court judge, determined "that the
special referee did not properly apply the law to the facts in this case." - S.C. at
281 S.E.2d at 477.
1982]
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the creditor is entitled to have the conveyance declared void. 5
Because the Banks did not foreclose, they were precluded from
relying on the Statute of Elizabeth as a defense.36
The court reviewed the facts in Tuller and concluded that,
unlike the usual voluntary conveyance case, substantial injury
would result from setting aside the mortgage since the plaintiff
had parted with valuable consideration. Cousins had relied on
the additional security of the 58-acre tract before advancing fur-
ther sums to Nantahala. In addition, the Banks should not be
allowed to select their collateral and later invoke the law of
fraudulent conveyances to reach other property.3 7 The court was
particularly unwilling to allow this result since the Banks chose
not to foreclose, thus failing to "assiduously [observe] all of the
prerequisites to such relief."38
By reaffirming the requirement of a judgment and a nulla
bona return as a condition precedent to voiding a fraudulent
conveyance, the South Carolina Supreme Court has preserved
the common-law rule that developed in conjunction with the
Statute of Elizabeth.3 9 This rule, by requiring a judicial determi-
nation of the existence and amount of debt, forces a creditor to
exhaust his legal remedies before seeking equitable relief. Thus,
the equitable remedy is available only to a creditor with a bona
fide claim. The rule ignores the hardships imposed on a creditor
by delays in obtaining a judgment and the attendant multiplic-
ity of lawsuits required to seek a remedy.
The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act 40 and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 1 have removed the disadvantages of
the common-law rule in some jurisdictions. Section 10 of the Act
provides that a creditor's action to set aside a fraudulent con-
35. 167 S.C. at 289, 166 S.E. at 148 (quoting from Richardson v. Rhodus, 48 S.C.L.
(14 Rich.) 95 (1866)).
36. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 477.
37. Id.
38. Id. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 478. The court found that since only a creditor can
attack a debtor's conveyance as being fraudulent, Hilton Head had no standing to offer
the Statute of Elizabeth defense. See Mitchell v. Cleveland, 76 S.C. 432, 57 S.E. 33
(1907). The court reasoned that the Banks, by acquiring all of the Hilton Head Co. stock,
would "stand in the same equitable shoes. .. " and also have no standing to raise this
defense. - S.C. at -, 281 S.E.2d at 478.
39. See GLENN, supra note 23, at § 65.
40. Annot., 7A U.L.A. 161 (1978).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(b).
[Vol. 34
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veyance may proceed although the creditor's "claim has not ma-
tured. 14 2 In the twenty-five jurisdictions that have adopted the
Act,43 courts have generally interpreted the language of section
10 as an abrogation of the requirement of a prior judgment."
Section 9 of the Act, which concerns the rights of creditors
whose claims have matured, has also been interpreted as abol-
ishing the requirement of a prior judgment. 5 Furthermore, Rule
18(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly allows a
creditor in the federal courts to set aside a fraudulent convey-
ance "without first having obtained a judgment establishing the
claim for money. "46
Although the facts in Tuller justify the court's decision to
allow Cousins to foreclose, the court's holding may prevent fu-
ture creditors from seeking the efficiency of a single lawsuit to
obtain an equitable remedy. This result is particularly unjust be-
cause creditors will be forced to continue seeking foreclosure to
avoid relinquishing their right to an equitable remedy. Adoption
of the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act or other legislative
measures to abrogate the archaic rule applied in Tuller would
provide the creditor with a simple choice: seeking the legal rem-
edy followed by the necessary actions or resolving the entire
matter in one action at equity.
Samuel L. Wilkins
42. Annot., 7A U.L.A. at 358.
43. Annot., 7A U.L.A. 21 (Supp. 1981).
44. See, e.g., Weisenburg v. Cragholm, 5 Cal. 3d 892, 489 P.2d 1126, 97 Cal. Rptr.
862 (1971); Park Oil, Inc. v. Getty Refining and Marketing Co., 407 A.2d 533 (Del. 1979);
Churchill v. Palmer, 57 Mich. App. 210, 226 N.W.2d 60 (1974); Marion v. Miller, 239
Minn. 214, 58 N.W.2d 185 (1953); Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Sullivan, 96 N.H. 430, 78
A.2d 508 (1951); Lomonaco v. Goodwin, 108 N.J. Super. 83, 260 A.2d 10 (1969); State of
Rio de Janeiro v. Rollins & Sons, Inc., 299 N.Y. 363, 87 N.E.2d 299 (1949); St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. State, Dept. of Natural Resources, Division of Forestry & Reclama-
tion, 25 Ohio Misc. 26, 265 N.E.2d 814 (1970); Thomas v. Stewart, 178 Okla. 308, 62 P.2d
966 (1936); Malis v. Zinman, 436 Pa. 592, 261 A.2d 875 (1970); Fidelity Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Reese, 41 S.D. 546, 171 N.W. 812 (1919); Running v. Widdes, 52 Wis. 2d 254, 190
N.W.2d 169 (1971); Platte County State Bank v. Frantz, 33 Wyo. 326, 239 P. 531 (1925).
45. American Surety Co. v. Conner, 251 N.Y. 1, 7, 166 N.E. 783, 785 (1929).
46. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(b).
1982]
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III. TESTAMENTARY TRUSTEES
In Dunn v. North Carolina National Bank,47 the South
Carolina Supreme Court significantly changed the law relating
to the administration of testamentary trusts. The court ruled
that South Carolina statutory provisions48 that prohibited the
naming of foreign corporations from contiguous states as testa-
mentary trustees but allowed the selection of foreign corpora-
tions from any other state were in violation of the equal protec-
tion clause of article I, section 3 of the South Carolina
Constitution.4"
In Dunn, the testatrix was a resident of North Carolina at
the time she executed a will naming North Carolina National
Bank (NCNB) as trustee of her pour-over trust.50 After retiring,
47. 276 S.C. 202, 277 S.E.2d 143 (1981).
48. S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-29-40 (1976), provides in relevant part-
(a) No corporation created by another state of the United States ... not hav-
ing a place of business in the State of South Carolina shall be eligible or enti-
tled to qualify, serve, or hold title to property in this State as testamentary
trustee of an estate of any person domiciled in this State at the time of his
death,. . . except however, such foreign corporations may act as testamentary
trustee in this State if:
(1) It has a bona fide capital of at least two hundred fifty thousand
dollars actually paid in;
(2) It is authorized to act as testamentary trustee in the state in
which it is incorporated or if such foreign corporation be a national
banking association in the state in which it has its principal place of
business; and
(3) Any bank or other corporation organized under the laws of this
State or a national banking association having its principal place of bus-
iness in this State is permitted by law to act as testamentary trustee in
the state in which such foreign corporation seeking to act in this State is
organized or in which it has its principal place of business if it is a na-
tional banking association without further showing or qualification other
than that it is authorized to act in such fiduciary capacity in this State
and upon compliance with the laws of such other state, if any, concern-
ing service of process on nonresident fiduciaries.
(4) Such foreign corporation is not domiciled or licensed to do bus-
iness in a state contiguous to the State of South Carolina.
(emphasis added).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 21-33-20 (1976), provides that "[n]otwithstanding anything to the con-
trary, no devise or bequest may be made by a will to the trustee of a trust where the
trustee or all of the trustees could not qualify as a testamentary trustee under the laws
of this State."
49. 276 S.C. at 207, 277 S.E.2d at 146.
50. Record at 1, 2. A pour-over trust is a provision in a will by which the testator
8
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she and her husband moved to Myrtle Beach, South Carolina,
where the testatrix subsequently died. During the administra-
tion of the estate, it was discovered that South Carolina law pro-
hibited NCNB from serving as testamentary trustee. The execu-
tor then sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes
preventing NCNB from serving as testamentary trustee were
unconstitutional."
The trial court ruled that the rights allegedly violated were
those of NCNB and that the executor therefore had no standing
to challenge the statutes.5 2 The court further found that the
statutes did not violate the equal protection clause of the South
Carolina Constitution.5  The South Carolina Supreme Court re-
versed on appeal and held that because the provisions precluded
a free choice of trustee, the testatrix's interests were sufficiently
affected to permit the challenge. 4 The court also held that the
statutes' arbitrary discrimination between similarly situated tes-
tators violated the equal protection clause.8 5
Most states have statutory provisions that control the abil-
ity of foreign corporations to serve as testamentary trustees.5 6
The majority, including South Carolina, condition testamentary
representation on the granting of a reciprocal right by the for-
eign corporation's state of domicile 57 and on the fulfillment of
certain statutory requirements. 8 South Carolina appears to have
been unique, however, in precluding corporations from contigu-
ous states from serving in this capacity.5 9 Because the laws of
leaves the residue of his estate to a trustee of a trust established during the testator's
lifetime. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1355 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
51. Record at 2.
52. Id. at 47, 48.
53. Id. at 55-59.
54. 276 S.C. at 205, 277 S.E.2d at 145.
55. Id. at 206, 277 S.E.2d at 146.
56. G. BOGERT, TRUSTS & TRuST-ss § 132 (2d ed. 1965 & Supp. 1980). E.g., ARiz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-107 (1977); COLO. REv. STAT. § 7-9-104 (1980).
57. A reciprocity clause allows a foreign corporation to serve as a testamentary trus-
tee only if that corporation's state of domicile affords a similar right to the corporations
of its state. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 108-801 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-132 (1975); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 476 (West 1953); TENN. CODE ANN. § 35-610 (1977).
58. These requirements generally are similar to those contained in S.C. CODE ANN. §
21-29-40. See supra note 48.
59. Particular statutory requirements vary widely. North Carolina permits only con-
tiguous states with reciprocal provisions to serve. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-132 (1975). Ne-
braska limits the foreign corporate trustee's right to hold real property within the state.
1982]
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North Carolina and Georgia contain reciprocal provisions, 0
South Carolina's former prohibition effectively denied corpora-
tions from these states a significant economic benefit that was
available to corporations from any other state.
Dunn's removal of this prohibition has two significant ef-
fects on the administration of testamentary trusts in this state.
South Carolina testators may now select otherwise qualified cor-
porations from any state as testamentary trustees. Moreover, be-
cause both Georgia and North Carolina have reciprocal statutory
provisions, South Carolina corporations may now serve as testa-
mentary trustees in those states.
R. Kent Porth
NEB. REG. STAT. § 76-402 (1976). A few states prohibit altogether testamentary repre-
sentation by foreign corporations. E.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 287.030, 395.001 (Bobbs-
Merrill Supp. 1980).
60. GA. CODE ANN. § 108-801 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-132 (1975).
[Vol. 34
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 13
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol34/iss1/13
